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ABSTRACT This paper analytically characterizes the four main environmental sustainability
paradigms (i.e., WS, weak sustainability; AG, a-growth; DG, de-growth; and SS, strong sus-
tainability) by introducing uncertainty about future preferences for consumption and future
technologies. SS represents an ethical approach because of its maximum aversion to inter-
generational inequality of resources, whereas DG depicts preference changes, AG depicts
technology changes, and WS represents the reference paradigm without accounting for
preference or technology changes. By comparing the costs and benefits of these paradigms,
solutions derived for the whole parameter domains based on data for a globally repre-
sentative individual suggest that whenever environmental sustainability is pursued for welfare
reasons within a utilitarian perspective (i.e., WS, AG, DG), it is not worth pursuing. In
contrast, if environmental sustainability is achieved for ethical reasons within an egalitarian
perspective (i.e., SS), it is worth pursuing, even with an increased world population. In terms
of feasibility (i.e., whether there are realistic parameter values such that a given sustainability
paradigm can achieve its goal), solutions are ranked ethics > preference > technology (i.e.,
SS > DG > AG), whereas WS is unfeasible. Thus, WS, AG, and DG are inconsistent sus-
tainability paradigms, SS empirically solves the theoretical dispute on absolute rights, and
environmental sustainability must be treated as an ethical issue. A conceptual discussion
about environmental ethics and a statistical analysis based on panel data at a country level
support the same insights. In terms of reliability (i.e., whether there are national policies or
international agreements which can support a feasible sustainability paradigm), SS could be
enforced by a global environmental agreement, supported by 66/55% of governments (i.e.,
top-down approach) and by 56/51% of citizens (i.e., bottom-up approach), in the most
certain/uncertain scenarios, respectively.
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The literature has recently begun to discuss to what extentglobal environmental sustainability is a technology issue ora preference issue (Bezin, 2019; Santarius and Soland,
2018; Tran, 2016; Aznar-Marquez and Ruiz-Tamarit, 2016;
Zagonari, 2015). In particular, Zagonari (2015) empirically
demonstrated that individuals in better-off developed countries
and individuals in worse-off developing countries can achieve
sustainability with a reasonable level of value changes (0 to 30%
decrease in the preference for consumption) and a feasible degree
of technological innovation (10 to 40% increase in efficiency),
respectively, whereas individuals in better-off developing coun-
tries and individuals in worse-off developed countries must rely
on an impractical degree of technological innovation (50 to 70%
increase) and on an unreasonable level of value changes (40 to
70% decrease), respectively.
The literature has also recently begun to emphasize the role of
ethics in achieving global environmental sustainability (Menning,
2016; Lenzi, 2017; Spahn, 2018). In this context, two main groups
of environmental ethics can be identified: secular and religious
ethics. Secular ethics focus on our perceived responsibility to
nature, perceived responsibility to future generations, perceptions
of the relative rights of humans and non-humans, and beliefs in
inter-generational and intra-generational equity (Zagonari, 2018).
In contrast, religious ethics have a different primary focus in each
religion: Judaism focuses on stewardship (here, maximizing the
use of resources to achieve the highest sustainable total welfare),
Islam focuses on trusteeship and parsimony (here, minimizing
the use of resources), Hinduism and Buddhism focus on main-
taining equilibrium, and Christianity focuses on love of neighbors
(Zagonari, 2020). In particular, Zagonari (2019a) empirically
shows that the perception of a sense of duty to nature is a ben-
eficial but unfeasible and unreliable way to achieve sustainability
in developed countries; in contrast, the perception of a duty to
future generations is detrimental to sustainability in both devel-
oped and developing countries; belief in the rights of future
generations is a beneficial and reliable but unfeasible way to
achieve sustainability in developed countries; intra-generational
inequality is detrimental, and inter-generational inequality is
essential, to achieving sustainability in both developed and
developing countries; in contrast, all secular ethics are unfeasible
and unreliable in developing countries. The religious ethics were
adequate, feasible, and reliable for Hinduism or Buddhism, Islam,
and Judaism, but were unfeasible for Christianity.
However, these papers did not account for uncertainty in the
preferences for consumption that characterize future generations
and in the technologies that may be available to future genera-
tions. Indeed, the current generation is expected to bear certain
monetary or opportunity costs to promote environmental sus-
tainability despite uncertainty about the perceived benefits for
future generations (e.g., think of ecosystem services) and the costs
they must bear (e.g., think of innovation expenditures). In other
words, the inter-generational discount rate applied to welfare
could be larger than its minimum (i.e., 0) or the aversion to inter-
generational inequality could be smaller than its maximum (i.e.,
1) if future generations can rely on technologies or are char-
acterized by preferences that imply a smaller use of resources.
Four main sustainability paradigms have been suggested: weak
sustainability (WS), a-growth (AG), de-growth (DG), and strong
sustainability (SS). WS is defined as the maximization of current
and future generations’ welfare subject to the constraint that
future generations’ welfare must be at least equal to that of cur-
rent generations (Schlör et al., 2015). AG is defined as the max-
imization of current and future generations’ welfare subject to the
constraint of sustainable use of resources permitted by techno-
logical innovations (Van den Bergh, 2010, 2011). DG is defined as
a sustainable use of resources subject to the constraint that future
generations’ welfare must be at least equal to current generations’
welfare due to preference changes (Kallis, 2011; Kallis et al.,
2012). SS is defined as a sustainable use of resources subject to
inter-generational equity in resource use (Jain and Jain, 2013).
The purpose of this paper is to test which sustainability para-
digm is worth pursuing, with worth determined by comparing the
benefits and costs, once uncertainties about future preferences
and technologies have been taken into account. Indeed, WS, AG,
and DG are based on a utilitarian perspective, whereas SS is based
on an egalitarian perspective. AG depends on technological
innovations that future generations can adopt, whereas DG relies
on preference changes that current generations should espouse.
SS rests on the intrinsic value of equality in the distribution of
resources between current and future generations. In other words,
by relying on the different features that characterize the four
sustainability paradigms, I will test whether sustainability
depends most strongly on technology (i.e., AG), consumption
preferences (i.e., DG), or ethics (SS).
Note that I will focus on a globally representative individual (i.e.,
sustainability includes the whole world’s population). However, I will
also discuss (Supplementary Appendix II) the distribution among
countries of the costs that must be paid to achieve sustainability (i.e.,
both OECD and non-OECD pre-industrial, industrial, post-
industrial countries). Moreover, I have chosen WS as the reference
sustainability paradigm against which the other forms will be
compared within a utilitarian perspective without requiring changes
in technology and preferences. Finally, I will focus on feasibility,
which I define as whether there are realistic parameter values for
future technologies and preferences such that a given sustainability
paradigm can achieve a satisfactory level of effectiveness, if properly
implemented. However, I will also provide insights (Supplementary
Appendix III) into reliability, which I define as whether there are
environmental national policies or international agreements which
can enforce a feasible sustainability paradigm, based on a theoretical
discussion and an empirical analysis.
Methods
Zagonari (2018) highlighted the main features of the four sus-
tainability paradigms. Supplementary Appendix I characterizes
the main features of these four sustainability paradigms within
the main approaches to environmental ethics about non-humans
and future generations. Here, I will use the constraints of these
four sustainability paradigms by comparing them in terms of the
set of parameters that meet the conditions for a feasible solution
after accounting for uncertainty in future technologies and pre-
ferences. In particular, I will assume that the current generation is
concerned about future generations, and I will focus on only two
generations; the current and next generations. This can be justi-
fied by the evidence that the current generation perceives more
accurately the near future (i.e., within their lifetime and that of
their immediate descendants) than the distant future (Diprose
et al., 2019), together with the urgency of the global sustainability
problem (Rockstrom et al., 2017). Moreover, I will assume a
normal distribution for future consumption preferences p(η) and
technologies p(θ), with alternative variances (σ) representing
uncertainty, but with means (μ) at 1.0 and 0.5, respectively. That
is, the most likely future preferences are current preferences,
whereas the most likely future technologies are twice as efficient
as current technologies. This choice of values for the means is
supported by the observed world dynamics of two variables in the
World Bank’s world development indicators database (http://
data.worldbank.org). In particular, energy use divided by per
capita GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis amounted
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to 0.29 kg of oil equivalent in 1990 and 0.12 in 2014, with an
average (linear) decrease per year of 0.007 and an overall decrease
of 58% during this period; in addition, the share of household
consumption expenditure based on per capita GDP was 59.0% in
1970 and 57.9% in 2017, with an average (linear) decrease per
year of 0.002 and an overall decrease of 1% during this period.
Note that I will perform sensitivity analyses that assume uniform
distributions for future preferences and technologies (i.e., the
probability of all possible values for future preferences and
technologies is the same). Finally, current costs are represented by
a possible reduction in current consumption, whereas future
gains are depicted by a sustainable society. This is justified by the
assumptions that humanity’s purpose is to continue to exist (i.e.,
based on the direct deontological value of the future generation)
and to alleviate pain (i.e., based on the indirect teleological value
of the next generation) (Franco et al., 2019).
Table 1 summarizes the notation I will use in the rest of this
Section and the values I used in Results. Note that it is implicitly
assumed that the current generation is risk neutral (i.e., it refers to
expected value), sustainability is properly measured by the eco-
logical footprint, and the next generation has the same size as the
current generation (i.e., the sustainable per capita resource use in
terms of ecological footprint is based on the current population).
Note that I will not consider the perceived duty to the current
generation (δ in Zagonari, 2018), which represents the concern of
citizens in developed countries for citizens in developing coun-
tries. This is because my analysis focuses on a globally repre-
sentative individual. Future research could add this factor to the
analysis. Moreover, my focus on only two generations (i.e., a
period of ca. 25 years) is consistent with the urgency of the global
sustainability problem (www.sdgindex.org/reports/2018). Finally,
I will not consider intra-generational equity (ε in Zagonari, 2018),
since my focus is on a globally representative individual. Future
research could add this factor to the analysis.
In the simplified context described above, WS can be depicted
as follows:
UF ¼ λ ESð Þα ≥UC ¼ λ Eð ÞαEβUFγ
 1= 1ζð Þ þUF1= 1ζð Þ
n o1ζ
ð1Þ
However, future technologies and consumption preferences are
uncertain. Thus, it is worthwhile pursuing WS (i.e., the
undiscounted benefits are larger than the costs) if the following
condition holds:
UF ≥ λ Eð ÞαEβUFγ











 α η p ηð Þ
With θ in [0, 1] to depict the current technology (i.e., θ= 1)
and the infinitely more efficient future technology (i.e., θ= 0),
and η in [0.5, 1.5] to depict the current preference (i.e., η= 1) and
the more or less demanding future preference (i.e., η= 0.5 or
η= 1.5, respectively).
In the simplified context described above, AG can be depicted
as follows:
UF ¼ λAG ESð Þα ≥UC ¼ λ ESð ÞαESβUFγ




λAG ¼ λEð Þ=ES > 1
In words, the current generation bears the costs of the transi-
tion to more efficient technologies (i.e., λAG > λ) by paying larger
prices for the same consumption level (i.e., λAGES= λE). How-
ever, future technologies and preferences are uncertain. Thus, it is
worthwhile pursuing AG (i.e., the undiscounted benefits are lar-
ger than the costs) if the following condition holds:
UF ≥ λEð ÞαEβUFγ











 α η p ηð Þ
Table 1 Summary of the notation and parameter values.
Definition Value
α Proportion of per capita GDP allocated to consumption 58%
β Proportion of per capita GDP allocated to nature conservation 2%
γ Proportion of per capita GDP allocated to green R&D 1%
ζ Aversion to inter-generational inequality [0, 1], where 1 is the maximum
η Ratio of current preference for consumption to future preference [0.5, 1.5], where 0.5 is the worst
θ Ratio of the efficiency of current technologies to future technologies [0, 1], where 0 is the best
λ Current GDP per unit use of resources 4.78 USD/ha
E Current per capita resource use in terms of ecological footprint 2.79 ha
ES Sustainable per capita resource use in terms of ecological footprint 1.70 ha
p(η) Probability of observing a given η for future preferences N[μ, σ] or Uniform distribution
p(θ) Probability of observing a given θ for future technologies N[μ, σ] or Uniform distribution
μ Mean of η or θ for future technology or preferences 1 for η and 0.5 for θ
σ Variance of η or θ for future technology or preference 1, 2, 3, 4
UC Welfare of current generation 4.38
UF Welfare of future generation 3.37
Each value not assumed in a specified range is based on the World Bank’s world development indicators database in 2012.
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In the simplified context described above, DG can be depicted
as follows:
UF ¼ λ ESð ÞαDG ≥UC ¼ λ ESð ÞαDGESβUFγ





αDG ¼ α log λ E½ =log λ ES½ ð Þ
In words, the current generation attaches a greater value to the
current consumption level (i.e., αDG > α) to achieve the same
welfare at a sustainable consumption level (i.e., (λE)α= (λES)αDG).
However, future technologies and consumption preferences are
uncertain. Thus, it is worthwhile pursuing DG (i.e., the undis-
counted benefits are larger than the costs) if the following condi-
tion holds:
UF ≥ λEð ÞαEβUFγ
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In the simplified context described above, SS can be depicted as
follows:
E ¼ Es ð7Þ
Thus, it is worth pursuing SS (i.e., the undiscounted benefits
are larger than the costs) if the following condition holds:






 α η p ηð Þ
Note that the competitive general equilibrium framework
amounts to WS without constraints or with non-binding con-
straints (i.e., sustainability within a competitive general equili-
brium framework is easier to achieve than WS due to the possible
substitution between current and future welfare). Moreover, a
discount factor of 0 amounts to an inter-generational inequality
aversion of 1, although the former should be correctly applied to
welfare, whereas the latter can be properly applied to resources.
Finally, SS is equivalent to an eco-centric Deep Ecology frame-
work for each time t and for each species (i.e., sustainability
within an eco-centric Deep Ecology framework is easier to
achieve than SS due to its references to resilience or resistance
goals and, consequently, its larger flexibility of equilibria).
Table 2 summarizes the main features of the four sustainability
paradigms.
Note that the substitutability of natural capital with other
forms of capital, which is allowed in all paradigms except SS, is
depicted by using welfare for WS, AG, and DG, but by using
resources for SS. Moreover, I assumed a constant population (i.e.,
the sustainable per capita use of resources is the same for the
current and next generations). Finally, the benefits and costs for
WS with substitutability equals the benefits and costs for SS
without substitutability (i.e., with UF ≥UC instead of EF ≥ EC) if
the maximum aversion to inter-generational inequality applies
(i.e., with ζ= 1 instead of ζ < 1).
From the World Bank’s world development indicators database
(http://data.worldbank.org), I obtained the proportion of per
capita GDP allocated to consumption (PPP) in 2012 (α): 58%. I
based the concern about the use of the environment (expressed in
terms of the investment in conservation of natural resources, β)
on the observed average government expenditure on environ-
mental protection as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries
(i.e., 1.7%; http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org). For concreteness, the
proportion of per capita GDP allocated to nature conservation is
rounded below at β= 0.01 for the world. I based the current
generation’s concern for the future generation (γ) on the average
observed expenditure on environmental R&D and patents as a
percentage of GDP observed in OECD countries (i.e., 2.4%;
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org). For concreteness, the proportion
of per capita GDP allocated to environmental R&D and patents is
rounded below at γ= 0.02 for the world. From the World Bank’s
world development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org), I
obtained the global per capita GDP (PPP) in 2012: USD 13 348. If
the per capita use of the global environment is measured by the
ecological footprint (i.e., the biologically productive area needed
to provide everything an individual consumes), the sustainability
of a globally representative individual at the current population
level requires ES= 1.70 ha (http://www.footprintnetwork.org),
whereas the use of the environment, based on data for 2012, is
E= 2.79 ha. Thus, the per capita use of the global environment
for GDP PPP (λ) is set at 4.78 USD/ha (i.e., USD 13 348 divided
by 2.79 ha). These parameters imply that UC= 4.38 and
UF= 3.37. Moreover, p(η) can be represented by N[1, σ] with
σ= 1, 2, 3, and 4, by assuming that the current value of α is the
most likely value in the future. This is supported by data at a
global level (http://data.worldbank.org), which implies that p
(η= 1.5) is 0.35, 0.19, 0.13, and 0.09 for σ= 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. Finally, p(θ) can be represented by N[0.5, σ] with
σ= 1, 2, 3, and 4, by assuming that half of the current value of λ is
the most likely value in the future. This is supported by data at a
global level (http://data.worldbank.org), which implies that p
(θ= 0) is 0.35, 0.19, 0.13 and 0.09 for σ= 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively.
Results
In this section, I will present the sets of η and θ which satisfy the
conditions defined in Methods for the four sustainability para-
digms in the main scenario (i.e., normal distributions for both
future preferences and future technologies) for the world repre-
sentative individual in 2012 with a constant world population.
Here, I define an “equivalence curve” as the couples of η and θ
such that the benefits equal the costs.
Supplementary Materials present sensitivity analyses based on
an increased world population (i.e., 10 billion, according to the
World Bank projection to 2050), on the one side, and, on the
other side, based on uniform distributions of preferences (i.e.,
future preferences depicted by η will be observed without
Table 2 Comparison of the four environmental sustainability
paradigms (WS weak sustainability, AG, a-growth, DG de-
growth, SS strong sustainability).
Conditions Technologies Preferences Intergenerational
inequity aversion
WS UF≥UC λ α ζ < 1
AG UF≥UC λAG α ζ < 1
DG UF≥ UC λ αDG ζ < 1
SS EF≥ EC λ α ζ= 1
Variables: UF, future utility; UC, current utility; EF, future ecological footprint; EC, current
ecological footprint; λ, use of resources per unit GDP; α, proportion of per capita GDP allocated
to consumption; ζ, aversion to inter-generational equity.
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uncertainty), uniform distributions of technologies (i.e., future
technologies depicted by θ will be observed without uncertainty),
and uniform distributions of both preferences and technologies
(i.e., future preferences and technologies depicted by η and θ,
respectively, will be observed without uncertainty).
Supplementary Appendix II presents probit estimations based
on a panel dataset for 181 countries from 1995 to 2017 to check
whether feasibility conditions (i.e., inequalities 1, 3, 5, 7) and
worthiness conditions (i.e., inequalities 2, 3, 6, 8) are satisfied at
country level, by focusing on specified groups of countries (i.e.,
pre-industrial, industrial OECD and non-OECD, post-industrial
OECD and non-OECD). Supplementary Appendix III char-
acterizes the main features of the collective action problems
involved in enforcing the egalitarian ethics behind the SS para-
digm, by presenting national policies and international agree-
ments within consequentialist and deontologist approaches.
Note that the world-representative individual approach (adop-
ted in this section) is grounded on sustainability being a global
issue, whereas the country-representative individual approach
(adopted in Supplementary Appendixes II and III) is founded on
environmental policies and agreements being implemented and
negotiated at a country level. The first approach compares ethics,
preferences and technologies in terms of feasibility, with impli-
cations for sustainability paradigms to be pursued; the second
approach highlights which country is more likely to benefit from
pursuing global sustainability, with implications for international
negotiations. In particular, the original panel dataset at a country
level accounts for both individual feelings and social identity (i.e.,
the main determinants of pro-environmental behaviors) (Zago-
nari, 2018). Moreover, the theoretical conditions required to apply
the representative individual at a country level are satisfied
(Zagonari, 2019b). Finally, the original panel dataset for observed
(rather than self-stated) pro-environmental behaviors avoids the
intention-action and attitude-action gaps (Zagonari, 2020).
Figure 1 shows all possible combinations of η and θ that meet
the conditions for WS and AG with σ at 1, 2, 3, and 4. For WS,
there are no solutions for any value of σ. For AG, there are no
solutions for σ= 2, 3, and 4 (i.e., large values of σ imply more
demanding changes in technologies and preferences), whereas if
σ= 1, an unrealistic solution could be achieved if the future
generation attaches 50% more value to consumption than the
current generation (i.e., they obtain 150% of current satisfaction
from the same current consumption level) and if the future
generation can rely on a technology that is 98% more efficient
(i.e., they obtain the same consumption level by using 2% of the
current resources).
Figure 2 shows all possible combinations of η and θ that
provide sustainability for DG and SS with σ at 1, 2, 3, and 4. For
DG, if σ= 3 or 4, there are no solutions (i.e., large values of σ
imply more demanding changes in technologies and preferences),
whereas if σ= 1 or 2, an unrealistic solution could be achieved if
the current generation attaches 50% more value to consumption
(i.e., they obtain 150% satisfaction from the same current con-
sumption level) and if the future generation can rely on a tech-
nology that is 97% more efficient than the current technology
(i.e., they obtain the same consumption level by using 3% of the
current resources). For SS, there is a solution for all values of η
and θ in the domains if σ= 2, 3 and 4, whereas if σ= 1, a realistic
solution could be achieved if the future generation attaches the
same value to consumption (i.e., they obtain the same satisfaction
from the current consumption level), and if the future generation
can rely on a technology that is 5% more efficient than the cur-
rent technology (i.e., they obtain the same consumption level by
using 95% of the current resources).
In summary, WS is never feasible. AG is feasible in 1 out of
4 scenarios (i.e., the most certain condition with σ= 1), but with
Fig. 1 Feasible solutions (areas below the equivalence curves) if the weak
sustainability (WS) and a-growth (AG) paradigms are applied for
combinations of future technologies (θ) and preferences (η), where θ= 1
depicts current technology and η= 1 depicts the current preference for
consumption. WS (yellow) is never feasible, so it is not shown. For AG
(blue), the only feasible equivalence curve refers to σ= 1 (the most certain
scenario); there are no feasible equivalence curves for σ= 2, 3, and 4.
Fig. 2 Feasible solutions (areas below the equivalence curves) if the de-
growth (DG) and strong sustainability (SS) paradigms are applied for
combinations of future technologies (θ) and preferences (η), where θ= 1
depicts current technology and η= 1 depicts the current preference for
consumption. For DG (red), the higher equivalence curve refers to σ= 1
(i.e., the most certain scenario), the lower equivalence curve refers to σ= 2,
and there are no equivalence curves for σ= 3 and 4. For SS (black), the
single equivalence curve refers to σ= 4 (i.e., the most pessimistic
scenario), but feasibility conditions are met for σ= 1, 2, and 3.
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unrealistic changes in future technologies (i.e., 98% more efficient
as depicted by θ= 0.02): a larger value must be attached to
consumption for less efficient technologies (i.e., the equivalence
curve for θ is increasing with increasing η). DG is feasible in 2 out
of 4 scenarios (i.e., the most certain conditions with σ= 1 or 2),
but with unrealistic changes in future technologies (i.e., 97% more
efficient as depicted by θ= 0.03): a larger value must be attached
to consumption for less efficient technologies (i.e., the equivalence
curve for θ is increasing with increasing η). SS is feasible in all
scenarios, although in the most pessimistic scenario, small
changes in future technologies (i.e., from 0 to 8% more efficient as
depicted by θ= 0.92) or future preferences (i.e., from 0 to 50%
more demanding as depicted by η= 1.5) are required: a smaller
value must be attached to consumption for less efficient tech-
nologies (i.e., the equivalence curve for θ is decreasing with
increasing η).
Figures S1 and S2 in Supplementary Materials account for the
estimated increase in the world population, by considering a
smaller per capita amount of resources in equilibrium. In short,
unfeasibility of WS, AD, and DG is unaffected, whereas SS is still
feasible in the most certain scenario for realistic changes in future
technologies and preferences.
Figures S3 to S7 in Supplementary Materials examine the
consequences of the assumption of uniform distributions of future
preferences, technologies or both. In short, eliminating uncertainty
about future technology levels has a smaller impact on feasibility
than eliminating uncertainty about future preferences.
Discussion
There is no literature on the effects of uncertainty in future
technologies and preferences on alternative sustainability para-
digms within an empirically validated theoretical framework for
religious or secular environmental ethics. Thus, it is not possible
to compare insights obtained in this paper with results achieved
by other studies.
Nevertheless, the main weaknesses of this study are as follows:
● I only consider one ethical principle (i.e., inter-generational
egalitarianism), with the maximum value for SS, and values
smaller than the maximum for WS, AG, and DG. This ignores
other ethical principles, such as secular ethics related to
anthropocentric vs. biocentric values, duties to nature or the
future generation vs. rights of nature or the future generation,
direct vs. indirect duties, and utilitarian vs. egalitarian
perspectives (See Supplementary Appendix I for a compre-
hensive summary of environmental ethics). For religious
ethics, it ignores primary focuses such as stewardship in
Judaism, trusteeship and parsimony in Islam, maintaining
equilibrium in Hinduism and Buddhism, and love of
neighbors in Christianity. However, future research could
refer to other ethical principles and religious precepts
depicted by quantity variables within a mathematical frame-
work (e.g., Zagonari, 2018; Zagonari, 2020).
● The focus is only on global and systemic sustainability, and
ignores local and sectoral sustainability. However, future
research could test if environmental services that require
ethical improvements (e.g., for local soil sustainability, waste
separation to increase recycling, including composting; for
local water sustainability, purchasing organic food to decrease
water pollution by reducing the use of pesticides and
fertilizers in agriculture; for global air sustainability, conser-
ving energy by updating a home’s heating or air conditioning
systems and light bulbs and by changing some lifestyle
choices such as dressing warmer to reduce the need for
heating or switching off lights in empty rooms to reduce
energy consumption and to decrease greenhouse gas
emissions) can be promoted by religious or secular ethics.
● I consider both feasibility and reliability of the only feasible
sustainability paradigm (i.e., SS), by empirically calculating
the proportions of governments (i.e., top-down approach)
and citizens (i.e., bottom-up approach) which would vote in
favor of a (balanced, stable, and efficient) global environ-
mental agreement designed to implement SS (see Supple-
mentary Appendix III for an ample discussion of national
policies and international agreements to cope with the
collective action problems involved in enforcing the egalitar-
ian ethics behind SS). However, future research could apply
inter-disciplinary approaches to check for the existence of
strong relationships between pro-environmental behaviors
and religious or secular ethics (e.g., Zagonari (2020) on
religious precepts), as well as for the existence of strong
relationships between pro-environmental behaviors and
international agreements (e.g., Mauerhofer (2019) on the
operating rules of environmental secretariats; Iyer et al. (2018)
on comparability of national contribution to sustainable
development to avoid free-riding; Chen et al. (2018) on self-
enforcing international environmental agreements; Shutters
(2016) on incentives and/or deterrents to restructure national
strategies to achieve sustainability at a global scale; Kim and
Bosselmann (2015) on ecological principles for
international law).
Note that my focus is on a globally representative individual so
the scale of value provider is disregarded; my use of instrumental
rationality within a normative perspective neglects commu-
nicative and bounded rationality, as well as recognition and
procedural justice; and my focus is on ethics as transcendental
values so contextual values are disregarded (Kenter et al., 2019)
In contrast, the main strengths of this study are as follows:
● It adopts a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach by
developing a theoretical model based on measurable variables
that let me find empirically calibrated solutions.
● The analysis is performed at a global and a country level
rather than at an individual level. The global theoretical
model let me eliminate the gap between an individual’s
expressed belief and their actions, to elicit persistent rather
than situational influences on behavior, and to minimize the
gap between reality and the simulation (Basedau et al., 2018).
● The paper considers ethics as a policy rather than as personal
traits, learning styles, values, and attitudes. The theoretical
model therefore let me include ethics to compare its collective
effects on promoting pro-environmental behaviors to achieve
global sustainability in terms of their feasibility.
Note that my finding that SS > DG > AG in terms of feasibility
is consistent with the change in preferences required by DG being
similar to ethics, since this change in the value attached to con-
sumption is based on a perceived duty to nature. Moreover, SS
empirically solves the theoretical dispute on absolute rights of
future generations (Skillington, 2019), since it theoretically
assumes (ex-ante) that inter-generational equity is pursued
regardless of its costs, but it turns out (ex-post) that benefits are
larger than costs. Finally, SS is a sustainability paradigm, whereas
Deep Ecology is an environmental framework, since it also con-
siders social issues (i.e., economic issues are instrumental to social
issues) by referring to the per capita amount of resources.
Although SS is focused on future generations (i.e., pain alleviation
of the current generation is less important than human continuity
for SS with respect to the main religions), the social issue could be
accounted for by considering the per capita minimum amount of
resources and the intra-generational distribution of resources for
the current generation.
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Combining Tables 3 and 4 in Supplementary Appendix I,
under the assumption that ethical rules have no intrinsic values
(i.e., ethical rules are instrumental to achieve environmental
sustainability), leads to the conclusion that environmental ethics
should refer to ethical principles behind the strong sustainability
paradigm (based on the intrinsic value of future generations), the
eco-centric framework (based on the intrinsic value of nature) or
the ethical precepts behind the main religions. Indeed, rights of
future generations or non-humans (i.e., limits to interests or
actions of current generation to enforce interests or actions of
future generations or non-humans) cannot be tightly supported
by laws, although somebody complains and restoration is possible
(Riley, 2016). In other words, exclude last columns on rights in
Tables 3 and 4. Uncertainty on future technologies or preferences
leads to disregard ethics based on welfare or eudemonic outcomes
(results highlighted above; Schaffartzik et al., 2016). In other
words, exclude columns on teleological approaches in Tables 3
and 4. Urgency of environmental sustainability implies that
indirect duties to nature is inadequate (Steffen et al., 2015). In
other words, exclude columns on duties to next generation in
Table 4. Note that SS persists both in Table 3 and in Table 4.
In summary, although this paper focuses on inter-generational
commutative egalitarianism behind SS as the only (secular)
ethical principle to achieve environmental sustainability, within
the world-representative individual approach, SS turns out to be
the only consistent (social and environmental) sustainability
paradigm (i.e., eco-centric and biomimetic are a-social and anti-
social ethics, respectively). Note that Zagonari (2019a) empirically
supports this conclusion, by comparing secular and religious
environmental ethics.
Table 14 in Supplementary Appendix II confirms at country
level the ranking of worthiness across sustainability paradigms
obtained for the world-representative individual: SS > DG, where
DG is feasible in the most certain scenario only; AG and WS are
unfeasible in all scenarios. Note that this is a remarkable result,
since the decision to adopt a sustainability paradigm in order to
achieve global sustainability for the world-representative indivi-
dual might be different from the majority decision of 181 country-
representative individuals, which depends on the country resource
uses and welfare levels. In particular, the ranking of worthiness for
SS across countries based on the comparisons between benefits
(i.e., a sustainable future generation) and costs (i.e., a renounce to
current welfare) is as follows: pre-industrial countries are most
likely to benefit from adopting SS for ethical reasons (i.e., they
renounce to current welfare as a small cost); then industrial
countries (i.e., they achieve sustainability as a large future benefit);
then post-industrial OECD countries (i.e., they achieve sustain-
ability as a large future benefit by renouncing to current welfare as
a large cost); then industrial OECD countries (i.e., they achieve
sustainability at a larger relative cost than industrial non-OECD
countries); and then post-industrial non-OECD countries (i.e.,
they achieve sustainability at a larger relative cost than post-
industrial OECD countries). Moreover, an increase in uncertainty
about future preferences and technologies reduces the worthiness
probabilities for all groups of countries. Finally, effectiveness of
environmental policies reduces the worthiness difference between
different sustainability paradigms (i.e., worthiness probabilities for
SS and DG are closer in OECD countries than in non-OECD
countries). Note that the most likely worthiness probability of pre-
industrial and industrial non-OECD countries is a beneficial result
for the world, since they represent 70% of the global population.
However, it might be a detrimental result for these countries, since
they are likely to have a smaller bargaining power in international
negotiations about environmental agreements.
In summary, within the country-representative individual
approach, WS and AG turn out to be unfeasible sustainability
paradigms, DG is feasible in the most certain scenario for all
groups of countries apart from post-industrial non-OECD
countries, and SS is feasible (i.e., environmental sustainability is
pursued for ethical reasons) and worth (i.e., benefits are larger
than costs) for all groups of countries in all scenarios, although
worthiness probability is different across countries and scenarios.
Table 16 in Supplementary Appendix III shows the proportions
of governments and citizens which would vote in favor of a global
environmental agreement designed to implement the SS paradigm.
These proportions are smaller with a larger uncertainty (to the
largest extent if σ= 1 is replaced with σ= 2), and they are larger for
longer commitments (to a greater extent for governments than for
citizens).
In summary, a global environmental agreement which solves
the collective action problems involved in the egalitarian ethics
behind the SS paradigm seem to be reliable, although a top-down
should be preferred to a bottom-up approach, and a longer
should be preferred to a shorter commitment.
Conclusion
By comparing the costs and benefits of different (secular) sustain-
ability paradigms, this paper revealed that whenever environmental
sustainability is pursued for welfare reasons within a utilitarian
perspective (i.e., WS, AG, DG), it is not worth pursuing because the
benefits do not exceed the costs. In contrast, if environmental
sustainability is achieved for ethical reasons within an egalitarian
perspective (i.e., SS), it is worth pursuing because the benefits do
exceed the costs. In other words, environmental sustainability is best
considered as a (secular or religious) ethical issue (White, 1967),
and SS is the only (secular) consistent sustainability paradigm.
However, SS is difficult to implement, since it relies on inter-
generational equity. Consequently, scholars should focus on
specific principles from secular ethics or specific precepts from
religious ethics that favor the achievement of the global sustain-
ability discussed in this paper or alternative combinations of
global plus local or systemic plus sectoral sustainability. In par-
ticular, SS is a complicated collective action problem, since there
are few governmental rules and social sanctions for unsustainable
consumption behavior, (future) generations who could benefit
from collective actions are different from (current) generations
who should adopt sustainable behaviors, there are no affordable
alternative technologies to achieve the desired consumption level
for everybody, some (often repeated) individual actions, char-
acterized by (often large) opportunity costs, might not produce
any (local) benefit or could produce (only) international benefits.
Consequently, scholars should also focus on global environmental
agreements that enhance the adherence to the SS egalitarian
perspective, although some ethical problems might remain.
Note that there is a tight relationship between religious
environmental ethics and the secular environmental ethics dis-
cussed in this paper. For example, an increase in α resembles the
parsimony that is valued by Islam, whereas stewardship in
Judaism is similar to ζ= 1, and equilibrium in Buddhism and
Hinduism is similar to an equal distribution of resources between
current and future generations. Moreover, this paper highlights
the main dilemma (i.e., achieving human continuity vs. reducing
human pain) behind the sustainability issue. Finally, environ-
mental ethics is treated as political economy in this paper (i.e.,
whether environmental precepts and principles can promote
desirable pro-environmental behavior).
Future development of the model in this study could analyze
the distribution of costs for sustainability within countries (e.g.,
by environmental sociology and economics) and the conditions
required to achieve a self-enforcing global agreement (e.g., by
environmental jurisprudence and economics).
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0467-7 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2020) 6:108 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0467-7 |www.nature.com/palcomms 7
Data availability
The datasets analyzed during this study come from public sour-
ces, as detailed in text: they are available from the corresponding
author on reasonable request.
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